Technological Singularity

Just to freak everyone out (or just me);

Nearly fully formed human brain grown in laboratory
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/news/11811044/Nearly-fully-formed-human-brain-grown-in-laboratory.html

& interview at;
http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2015/s4296243.htm

"As well as neurons and their signal-carrying projections – axons and dendrites – the "brain" also contains support and immune cells. It has 99 per cent of the genes present in the fetal brain, a rudimentary spinal cord, and even the beginnings of an "eye"."

:huh:

CryojenX wrote: I believe Intel is missing a key part of the power of the human brain, there is evidence to believe that neurological processing power is far more vast than previously believed, as computation may be taking place not on the neuron/synapse level, but rather on a molecular, and possibly even quantum level within the structural framework of tubulin molecules within each cell. This would increase the computing power needed to match the human brain by many orders of magnitude.

I doubt it will be difficult to replicate synchronicity between neurons. What the authors of that article presume is that every molecule in a neuron is a quantum bit that forms a coherent quantum computer with trillions of neurons made of billions of bits. SO like a trillion billion bit quantum computer. If that were the case, we could easily factor large numbers into primes, but we can't so it isn't true.

Gisteron wrote: The chess computer operates within the world and the ruleset of chess, not because it has no original thoughts within it, but because that is it's world. Likewise, our world is this world and we can't arbitrarly choose to disobey the laws of physics out of the originality of our thoughts.

The chess computer interacts with human beings and possibly other things. Something capable of original thought would be able to capitalize on that interaction. The chess computer has no wants, no needs, no feelings, no thoughts. It is merely a tool. To suggest especially in the case of the chess computer that it has any form of identity, ideas, original thought, or anything else is in my opinion quite foolish. It fulfils a function based on pre-programmed events. That's why you can figure out what an AI is going to do while playing computer chess and maximize on those opportunities almost every time. I have a shogi program which, while it doesn't always make the same moves, generally follows the same strategy, and it didn't take more than three tries to be able to beat the computer every time. But assuming you're talking about the theoretically perfect chess machine, which is able to function at the level of a world champion and adapt to situations on a human level, it is still the case that its functions are limited to the game of chess. It will never wonder; it will never evolve; it will fulfil one function.

Demanding that the chess computer operate outside of chess is demanding that the human operate outside of the reality it experiences, so I do think that it is a little unfair. What is more than a little unfair is making this demand after the prior one was met. Shifting the goal post, if you will...

Not at all. The chess machine can never display strong AI unless it operates outside of the strict rules of a chess match. Any adaptive or "smart" AI in a chess computer can easily be explained as random chance or a complex pre-programmed set of responses and initiatives. Even if we were to grant that it's not fair to expect the chess computer to act outside of chess, there is still no way that you can demonstrate a strong AI in a chess computer. It is for that reason that your example is a poor one, and it will not do at all in convincing me of the possibility of strong AI.

Now, when it comes to the socratic method, I frankly do not know what it takes to program a machine that could operate within it. Surely no self-awareness is required, but then again, many people are having trouble either performing it or learning from it being performed upon them. It was original and new back in Plato's day, but it is not an end-all solution to all learning problems everybody ever had.

Of course, I'm assuming you've read more than a few of Plato's dialogues, which I think is a fair assumption. The Socratic method generally requires that the individual have strong logical capabilities, combined with intuition. The intuition comes and then what comes about it analyzed. This is brought forth by a question. OF COURSE computers will excell at hearing a fact and then spitting it back out later. It's merely "if A then B". If that's all you consider learning to be, then you will be satisfied with the AI we've had for decades. Heck, you'd be satisfied with a hand calculator as evidence of strong AI.

Geometry on the other hand can easily be taught to anything that has a remotely logical brain, because it follows necessarily and inescapably from set theory alone. Birds and bats and many other animals who show no sign of a mind by the standards you set in your previous post can still apply, consciously or instinctively, geometric algorithms to navigate. Now, can they do seven-dimensional algebra? No. They didn't evolve to, because they don't need to. But we can and I see no reason why computers couldn't in principle. Which leads me into the next point.

This makes me think you missed the point. I was referencing Meno, where Socrates means to demonstrate that knowledge is pre-existent in the soul. Of course, we know that this isn't entirely true; people learn from others. But what I mean to say is that we have not seen any machine, nor do I think we ever will see a machine, which is capable of intuition. Obviously, the machine is capable of logical reasoning and can come to conclusions based on that. But it cannot come to those same conclusions through intuitive processes, and that's one of the main differences between AI and organic intelligence. You may say "the end result is the same; the computer comes to know geometry", but that isn't the point at all. And frankly, that kind of pragmatism is off-putting, as it makes philosophy nearly impossible to conduct, ignoring the great arguments of metaphysics throughout the ages and ultimately bringing the entire field down a bit.

I challenged you to devise a way to identify a mind when you see one, and apparently you cannot. Now, you do say that it questions the validity of empirical data, and that is fine. However, by doing so, you are basically admitting that there is no way of identifying that difference you are talking about and that frankly you don't have a way of knowing that it is actually there. As a result, the concept is rendered irrelevant.

Demonstrating through empirical data is not the goal of philosophy. Philosophy deals with logical constructs. There are some fringe philosophers such as William James who hold by a radical empiricism, but they are few and far between and I do not subscribe to their beliefs, strictly. What I do agree with is this rational argument from Descartes: that sensory information has, in the past, been inaccurate; that we should try our best to make arguments only with what we know for certain; that I may be deceived in my sensory perceptions, and as a result I should not strictly trust sensory perception; that the existence of a body cannot be verified without the influence of sensory perception; that something must be deceived or otherwise experience mental processes in order for any of this to be possible; and that mental processes are products of the mind, meaning that the existence of the mind can be verified without the influence of sensory perception.
Of course, I'm sure you're familiar with the argument. But Descartes' strategy of doubt as employed here brings doubt to the validity of things experienced through sensory perception, saying instead that, "no, the existence of the mind is relevant; it is instead the insistence on empirical verification which is irrelevant, as that cannot be verified through thought experiments alone, and depends on data which may or may not be the product of deception." So in order to establish that technological singularity can come about, a great many things have to be established first without the influence of sensory perception, and I don't expect you to do that; it would take a very long time. I would rather you demonstrate why we should trust things based in sensory perception in the first place, as this should be much faster.

There is nothing "scientific minded" about saying that you know something based on inductive reasoning.

How do you define science? I define it was a subfield of philosophy which follows the philosophical construct known as the scientific method, wherein test-retest validity is determined and one may come to conclusions based off of overwhelming statistical probability rather than pure logical formulation.
Ever present in any science is the possibility of being wrong in some way; even if it is an incredibly small chance, a fraction of one millionth of a percent, there is no scientific idea, not even the laws of physics, which can be said are absolute and can never change. This means that we're saying not that "it is the case that X", but "it is by far most likely that it is the case that X". Scientific knowledge, then, is based entirely on induction as opposed to deduction, and it is for this reason that I say that inductive reasoning is scientifically minded.

You are here, you think he has something interesting to contribute, so you represent him, if you so wish. Seeing how the mind by your own admission is untestable by virtue of and in addition to it making no difference that could be verifiable even in principle, I don't see why you'd need to, but that is your choice to make.

See above.

In the mean time, the situation we find ourselves in with this argument is one that I can lazily play in my favour in the following manner: To Jedi one would assume it necessary that there be a life essence of sorts, but given the version of it that you suggest, I'm afraid I must say Occam's Razor disposes of it rather snappily.

I'd say the exact opposite is the case. For Occam's Razor to apply, you should say that I am operating under more assumptions than you are. However, I am following Descartes' strategy of doubt. This would mean that my only assumption, if you can call it that, is that we are capable of being deceived by our perceptions. Since you are a fan of demonstration, I should point to optical illusions as a perfect example of sensory perception not being perfect, and ultimately that we can be deceived through our perceptions. Remember that dress problem a while back on the internet? Is it white, or is it blue? There was great disagreement, but it should be clear that it is the fact that the disagreement came about in the first place that is of interest here, demonstrating perfectly our ability to be deceived through the senses.

In comparison, you are assuming not only that sensory perception is of value, but also a great many other things. You are assuming that you are not being deceived, to name only one other thing; but this should suffice in pointing out that I'm quite safe on the dull edge of Occam's Razor.

Adder wrote: Just to freak everyone out (or just me);

Nearly fully formed human brain grown in laboratory
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/news/11811044/Nearly-fully-formed-human-brain-grown-in-laboratory.html

& interview at;
http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2015/s4296243.htm

"As well as neurons and their signal-carrying projections – axons and dendrites – the "brain" also contains support and immune cells. It has 99 per cent of the genes present in the fetal brain, a rudimentary spinal cord, and even the beginnings of an "eye"."

:huh:

dude you are like a pirates hidden treasure of awesome information

I remember about six months ago i read that scientists had been able to grow a heart and a lung in a lab but the impression i was left with was that a brain is way more complicated than what was currently possible - i guess that impression was not correct

i havent read the article yet but if it is as it suggests, this is really REALLY incredible

So quickly a few words on philosophy of science, though I think that this is perhaps a conversation better held over PM, in a different thread, or in chat or on the hangout. Suffice it to say that deductive and abductive reasoning are no lesser part of science than induction and in fact the entire enterprise of testing and retesting would have no purpose whatsoever, were it not for prior deduction in particular. Philosophy of science would also have it that science is an enterprise aiming for truth when in fact truth has little to no relevance in any actual scientific study aside maybe from history, but that's beside any point you made, so I shan't press it.

Since we were discussing the technological singularity (which is a synthetic matter, by the way, and thus a matter of epistemic filters beyond mere logic and completely outside of metaphysics altogether), I thought we operated on the base assumptions that reality was in fact real. If you wish to go down the solipsist route instead, be my guest, but I shan't follow. I have made my case, you have made yours and now that I ask for consistent standards, you ignore it, despite quoting it right back to me. You make up more arbitrary and ill-defined standards (like "intuition" or "soul", as if you could demonstrate that you yourself had any such a thing) as you go, and I'm frankly done pursuing your constantly shifting goal posts if you fail to acknowledge how your previous ones were already hit in the very quotes you throw right back at me! And that is setting aside how in the meantime you try to slip down into the solipsist rabbit hole because that is the only escape out of the corner you now find yourself in.

I didn't think I need to assert that reality is real, but now in order to escape the inevitable you assume that it isn't, leaving me with the burden to prove it to you. You are shifting the goal post again, but this time I am frankly comfortable letting you do that because if denying reality is what it takes to keep your case afloat, I think it high time that I rest mine.

Gisteron wrote: So quickly a few words on philosophy of science, though I think that this is perhaps a conversation better held over PM, in a different thread, or in chat or on the hangout.

Agreed.

Since we were discussing the technological singularity (which is a synthetic matter, by the way, and thus a matter of epistemic filters beyond mere logic and completely outside of metaphysics altogether), I thought we operated on the base assumptions that reality was in fact real. If you wish to go down the solipsist route instead, be my guest, but I shan't follow.

I didn't mean to invoke solipsism. I merely presented the strategy of doubt and how it lead to the mind-body problem in simplistic terms. And in this situation, speaking of singularity (not simply a powerful AI, but actual technological singularity) I think it is a necessary discussion to have. As my original argument went, yes, you may be able to recreate a human brain in a machine, but you cannot recreate the mind, and this is why we won't see singularity.

I have made my case, you have made yours and now that I ask for consistent standards, you ignore it, despite quoting it right back to me. You make up more arbitrary and ill-defined standards (like "intuition" or "soul", as if you could demonstrate that you yourself had any such a thing) as you go, and I'm frankly done pursuing your constantly shifting goal posts if you fail to acknowledge how your previous ones were already hit in the very quotes you throw right back at me!

All I have seen is a call for radical empiricism and as a result I am not satisfied with you "hitting" the goal post. And there is a difference between moving goal posts and natural progression of discussion. My fundamental stance still has not been addressed, that stance being a mind as separate from the body from the basic cogito, ergo sum argument as seen in meditations 2 (wherein the phrase did not actually appear). You have yet to provide a strong argument against it, merely calling it irrelevant due to your tendencies towards empiricism. And, if empiricism is demanded of you, then I demand to know why you hold so strongly to this pragmatic viewpoint. I think that is only fair, as I have justified my Cartesian stance well enough. If you don't want your empiricism challenged, then don't demand it at every point, and it won't be addressed.

I didn't think I need to assert that reality is real, but now in order to escape the inevitable you assume that it isn't, leaving me with the burden to prove it to you. You are shifting the goal post again, but this time I am frankly comfortable letting you do that because if denying reality is what it takes to keep your case afloat, I think it high time that I rest mine.

Oh, I never denied reality. I simply pointed out that you can't sit smugly and rely on Occam's Razor, and that I can just as easily turn that around on you -- which I did. Now you reject the criticisms based on... what? That you don't like the fact that a materialist, empiricist viewpoint can be disagreed with? Of this I am not entirely sure.

Regardless, I have done as you asked and provided the argument by Descartes which you insisted on. If there is a mind as separate from body, then human beings cannot create an AI capable of singularity. You agreed to that point already. And, I have provided an argument for a mind as separate from the body, which you have not addressed.

1. There is a mind as separate from the body. (Descartes, meditations 2, as previously written and simplified.)
2. This mind is non-corporeal.
3. Human beings cannot create non-corporeal things.
4. :. Human beings cannot create a mind.
5. Singularity would require that an AI would operate in the same way as a human mind/brain combination. (In other words, that singularity would require a mind -- something you've already agreed to.)
6. This AI would have to be created by humans. (Unless you argue aliens -- then just replace the word "human" with "alien" at every point and the argument is the same.)
7. Being unable to create a mind, humans could not create an AI capable of singularity.
8. :. Technological singularity is impossible.

Based on what I've proposed and what you've already agreed to, there is no way for humans to create an AI capable of singularity. Unless you can disprove any of those things, I don't see how you can stand against it.

Oh, and by the way.

ill-defined standards (like "intuition" or "soul"

"Soul" here is in the classical sense and just functionally means "mind", as is common in the reading of ancient philosophy. Intuition is... fairly self explanatory, isn't it?

In any case, I also pointed out that AI can't be capable of induction. And by induction, I mean coming to conclusions without absolutely certain premises. I guess they could allow for "do action x if situation y is 95%+ likely", but that's a lot more rigid than what we tend to think of as inductive reasoning, and I don't think you would disagree with me on that. If you do, tell me why.

A conclusion from induction is not a conclusion from less than certain premises. I actually did myself program code that would save a value to a variable and then change or keep that value based on further input or in some cases drop its usage altogether, which is what you are talking about but which is not at all inductive reasoning. Induction is the method of proving general mathematical propositions by proving their applicability in particular cases and how their applicability remains unchanged for finite variations of the input parameters. Another form of inductive reasoning is the recognition of patterns in large samples and adjustment of the idealized patterns designed to predict further samples as the sample size grows. Both of these are well within the capabilities of a computer.

Now, as for the argument, here is the problem: What a mind absent a body is, is still pending a definition. You see, Descartes assumes that he actually can doubt having a brain and at the same time he cannot doubt having a mind (whatever that is). That it is even possible that the thing he would call "I" to exists whilst his body doesn't. That possibility needs to be demonstrated and until it is, I am as free do dismiss it without evidence as he is to assert it without evidence. Nor does he - in your version of the argument - demonstrate that or why we must operate exclusively on what we can know for certain, a premise everything following it is rested upon. Thanks to the is-ought problem I don't think there is a way for him to show this.
However, you already granted that you cannot tell a mindless machine from a mind-posessed human being if they act equivalently. For some reason you are saying that the singularity requires the machine to act like a human would but also that that requires a genuine non-corporeal mind underneath (which still remains undefined). You have yet to demonstrate that the latter is a necessary condition for the former - or indeed even a sufficient one.

So in short, your fundamental stance of a mind as separate from the body is not something you get to assert and demand of me to disprove. The onus is on you to define what such a thing is and that it is possible, neither of which you did either paraphrasing Descartes or on your own. Living in this reality I dare assume, as do you, for practical purposes, I know that brains exist and that some of them are too complex to be perfectly predictable with the limited knowledge we have of any individual one at any given point in time. You assume all that, plus that the unpredictability is the product of this magical entity called the "mind" that operates from within the brain but is technically not connected to it. Occam's Razor has no problems at all disposing of this additional assumption. Now, if in order to escape it's merciless cut you wish to claim that you do not assume this reality in the first place, then again, that is fine, and I can rest my case. If for the mind to be real, reality must not be real, I really don't feel like I need add anything more, or do I?

Intuition is not "fairly self-explanatory". To me it is a feeling of some degree of certainty towards an issue I do not recall being consciously familiar with. All I can say is that I do not know where my seeming knowledge is coming from. Do you want to invoke an argument from incredulity perhaps and assert that since you don't know of a genuine explanation, therefore it is the product of an unexplainable and undefined magical entity you choose to call the "mind"? Be my guest. You say this seeming knowledge of unknown origin is something machines cannot have, yet at the same time you say that machines cannot have any level of self-awareness or consciousness, so technically the way you see it they would never have anything but intuition. Trying to have it both ways again, are we?

However, you already granted that you cannot tell a mindless machine from a mind-posessed human being if they act equivalently. For some reason you are saying that the singularity requires the machine to act like a human would but also that that requires a genuine non-corporeal mind underneath (which still remains undefined).

Alright, Gisteron. I understand your point of view and its practical nature, but I don't understand how you can consider it satisfactory. Consider this situation:
I have, by some miracle, found out everything about you. I know all of your tendencies, every aspect of your mind and body, even those things kept secret and hidden away possibly even from yourself. And I have created a machine with synthetic skin and hair and silent parts which consumes organic material after it has been prepared (cooked food) in order to fuel itself; it even excretes artificial waste (though I'm not sure you would want to verify that). It has a strong AI which perfectly simulates who you are. In essence, it is a perfect replica, though its insides are mechanical and manmade. (I don't believe that this is possible, but please go along with it.)
This thing has your thinking methods and looks exactly like you. It has even been made to gain and lose weight and age like a human being. It also has all of your memories.
Anyone in the room with it would say "Yep, that's Gisteron!" And you would protest, saying, "No, it's not me. I'm me. There's only one of me."
But why would you do this? Functionally, it is you, isn't it? It does everything that you do, thinks the way you do, et cetera. How can you possibly object to saying that it is you?
You are caught up in this mindset of "It looks like a duck, sounds like a duck; it's a duck." But what makes the duck? Is it the quack and feathers or is it the DNA/RNA, chromosomes, and so on? It seems to me that for no good reason you would be fine with saying that an AI has reached singularity even if it is only through superficial behavior, without any comment on any of the actual internal thought processes which may occur in the AI. You say this because there is no possible way to validate whether or not the AI robot is thinking.
Suppose that the robot copy of you from the example isn't really a strong AI, rather something with an incredibly large amount of "if-then" scenarios programmed into it which represent all of the actions and words that a human being will say. Then it's not really reached singularity, but it is convincing enough that any human being would think that it is, indeed, a human being. What you're suggesting is equally as unrealistic as me suggesting solipsism, since you are suggesting that we just accept this at face value regardless of the fact that we cannot EVER possibly know whether or not the robot actually is thinking!
For what reason do you think that this is acceptable, wishful thinking aside?

Well... If you ask me to prove that I am thinking myself, I couldn't do it either, because what we call "actual thinking" vs "robotic thinking" is a matter of what does the thinking, not how the thinking comes about or where it leads. Without exception, every thought I have is a result of a myriad of if-then processes, namely "if action potential is reached - then transmit signal to adjacent neurons". Not all my reactions are stored in a look-up table, but at the core, all of them are outputs of bio-electrical strictly logical circuitry, even those that on the face of it seem irrational or emotional. If my cicruits can function the way they do, I see no reason why artificial ones couldn't. I must by default assume that they could, seeing how simple natural mechanisms can be copied, and the capacity to copy does not change with small changes of complexity (yey, mathematical induction at work!).

You assume that I would object to people identifying the machine as myself, but I wouldn't. I do not subscribe to a notion that there is an essence of me-ness nothing else can share. Of course the very first memory that machine would form would inevitably be different from my own, and be it only because we cannot occupy the same space at the same time, so as time passes by one could in principle be able to tell us apart since it would grow and change differently from myself, unless we kept merging memories every now and again. I do not insist that there can be only one. Why would I? Am I this insecure that I would require a notion of uniqueness to the point where I'd deny what is actually happening? I am perfectly fine acknowledging that the machine, the instant it was created, was exactly like me and therefore everybody is justified in calling it by my name. I would probably treat it as I would treat myself and if we do indeed keep merging memories, I would be comfortable assuming full responsibility for its actions as well as giving it full responsibility over mine. It is not that there is no second one like me because I am unique. Rather the other way around: I am unique, because there is nobody else like me. If there was, whether I liked it or not, I would have to acknowledge the fact that I am not unique any longer. Chances are, machine-me would feel about it the same way I would if it were activated to be informed that whilst its memories are that of a unique being, they are in fact not unique anymore.

Of course, you'd have to be able to predict that I would respond to that neuron comment. Observing neurons is doing just that: observing neurons. I can grant that there is a correlation between thought and the firing of neurotransmitters and all of that fun stuff, but I can't grant you that the thought itself is the signal transmission between neurons. It could be the case that the thought causes the signal, that the signal causes the thought, that by some stretch of cosmic luck the signal and thought are completely unrelated but simultaneous, or many other things because, again, I find Descartes' argument convincing and see no reason to simplify everything into just body mechanics.
With that aside, I think you're missing the point entirely on my robot example. The fact is that even if you and the robot had a link where all of your thoughts were shared (let's say it's in some alternative reality where everything is the same but it exists there instead of you, or something ridiculous), or any other situation, there is still a difference between the two of you. Namely, it is composed of synthetic materials and metals, whereas you are flesh and bone. Nobody would ever know the difference between the two of you because nobody's going to take either of you apart.
There is a massive and difference between you and the copy in reality, but if you only view things from that "it looks/sounds like a duck, it is a duck" mentality, you won't recognize the difference. These two objects are not the same, but you're perfectly fine with saying that they are both the same thing because of superficial reasons, and I just don't think that's acceptable.