The impact of people's need for control

I have been thinking about this particular subject. Control is something we as humans completely need. Or is it? I myself think that it is the great downfall of man. It is our need for control that keeps us at war. It is why countries are so often times at odds with one another. I wish to see the Jedi community's opinion upon this matter.

A function of authority probably. This might all relate to oneself in that if you've no control over yourself you might feel lower self worth. So anyone without any authority might exert control outwards to increase a sense of self worth, in lieu of self control. Or someone who wants to maintain existing authority without exerting control internally might extend control outwards to both intimidate/pacify internally and try to gain more authority by accumulation of that outer and stabilization of the inner. Obviously is they wanted to exert control internally then they already have that authority.... so what is authority: a right to control IMO. Who determines the right to control, participants.... in joining, or being part of a process to determine as much.

My most salient example is in aviation, the relationship between aircrew and air traffic controllers. The aircrew are responsible for their aircrafts flying but they have rules to follow. The ATC have degrees of authority and that is to assist the aircraft do what they want to do... but sometimes by virtue of participating in a system of other aircraft the ATC have to control where an aircraft is allowed to go. They have authority, they exert that as control as required.... but they do not actually have control. A pilot can ignore a directive but they might get in a heap of trouble, never fly again.... or die trying! It's why its important to know the rules and follow them, or build a better system based on 'evidence based practice'

If I were to reduce it to relationships, on an individual level, the need to control tends to stem from a lack of trust or confidence in another's abilities or motives. Scale it up a bit to see why countries exert their power and authority over other countries that they oversee. This could be out of greed, competition, or other motivators.

What has a simple answer cannot be a complicated question. I don't think that a lot of conflict between individuals or communities can be safely reduced to just a "need/desire for control". For one, it isn't much of a reduction to begin with in that more is assumed than said about what we even mean by need or control. Also, what would then be the difference is between a situation where the participating parties have a need for control and one where they do not?
Now, I am being slightly pedantic here. Of course in colloquial settings we roughly understand each other when speaking of control.
I don't think it is at all a controversial to say that, even from a very calculating perspective, we are mortal. Time any one of us gets to take part in the game of life is finite, as are the resources at our avail, and by the sheer likelihood of such things surviving we carry genes that generally promote the survival of their carriers for at least as long as it takes to spread them with maximal efficiency. Natural fears of circumstances that can get in the way of our genes' success in this are coded into us. This includes an instinct for survival but also a desire for prosperity, and for the well-being of our neighbors. After all, genes we share with them and with our offspring are more likely to survive in bodies that are in health and security than in those that are not.
We do not just want raw survival in the moment, we want security of the future for ourselves and our fellows. We want that the future on the one hand provide for us but we also want to see it in advance and to take action to optimize it for the current and future copies of our genes' well-being. We want, in a word, "control", and this is so fundamental to us - not even as humans but as heirs to lineages that have been bred for survival for billions of generations - that there is no escaping it. But just as every competition for resources of all kinds is a consequence of our prioritizing carriers of our own genes over those we share less with, so is pretty much every advancement we have made. This is easy enough to say of technologies, but I'd go as far as to assert that even the arts are a means to cope with our emotions, to communicate and bond with our fellows, and thus to improve our security and control over the immediate environment and future. Far from it being a bleak mechanistic view to say that we are survival machines and that without exception everything we do reduces in its motives to something along that line, it is astonishing and inspiring just how complicated the structures are that have emerged from what is ultimately a very singular condition: Finitude.
And complicated these structures are indeed. When we say control in the context of this topic, we might think of the overly jealous partner, or the power-hungry sovereign, or their respective victims, but follow the thread down as far as it will go, and a far more complicated web of motivations turns out to be connected with them all. Why we do things is not a simple question. We could boil it down to something very simple if we had to, surely, but that I don't think would much help us much understand and predict each other. On the other hand, certainly, it cannot be boiled down to a higher level motivation like "control" without overlooking most of what else moves us at that level.

ghost of the mist wrote: I have been thinking about this particular subject. Control is something we as humans completely need. Or is it? I myself think that it is the great downfall of man. It is our need for control that keeps us at war. It is why countries are so often times at odds with one another. I wish to see the Jedi community's opinion upon this matter.

This is only own personal view and can and will differ from others practice.

On the subject of control
Man , I try my hardest to control things. I’m human. It’s my nature to be the dominant one by my raise and by my time in the army... not excuses , but in real life that’s where they come from for me. I have come to the point in my own Jedi ism that I understand the need and the not need ... of that makes sense. ?? As a believer in the Force and as a seeker and as a server of the Force I also understand the ebb n flow of things. Have to or ide go nuts ! Balance is key to everything in life often times and for me - I’m no exception.
I’m a cook by trade and choice ( small jobs led to a obsession ) now , I cook for my family and we all sit at the table. There’s an open invitation to my family and friends. So at any given time we can have a few more feet tucked under the table- my practice of control kicks in and I could very well - become Gordon Ramsey and pitch a fit when they show up un announced or —-add a few chairs - pour a few rounds - and laugh until some one falls asleep or passes out from all the fun. Point is - I can be in control as much as I can but I also try to remember - some times the wind blows and the rain falls - it all depends on me and how I perceive things at times.
In my meditations I control my thought and my flow. Then.... at times I do not.

Me personally - I try to make room for all but that’s my own choice.

Our apparent need for control is the result of an incomplete / undeveloped mind. One that is driven by instinct rather than rational thought.

The obsession to control arises from fear of the unknown. We fallaciously believe that there is no unknown as long as we seemingly control our environment.

The fact is: once we've conquered our fear of the unknown (and in our lives, close to everything is unknown - what we believe to know is only a infinitesimally tiny amount of our actual environment and our place in the Force), the need for control automatically disappears.

The sooner we realize fearlessness and stop wasting our resources on attempting to control what is inherently chaotic and uncontrollable, the sooner we become peaceful, free from fear and happy. We can then use our resources to benefit others.

Cyan Sarden wrote: The obsession to control arises from fear of the unknown. We fallaciously believe that there is no unknown as long as we seemingly control our environment.

In order to have control, would we not need to have knowledge/understanding? Why is this a fallacious inference to make, that the extent to which we control our environment it is known to us, and by extension, the extent to which we can maximize control is as well the extent to which we can minimize the unknown?

... in our lives, close to everything is unknown - what we believe to know is only a infinitesimally [sic] tiny amount of our actual environment and our place in the Force...

Would one not have to know enough of the environment and the Force and the amount of human knowledge in order to make that comparison? How do you know how much there is to know? I'm not necessarily arguing the opposite here - though this is not to say that I couldn't - I'm just pointing out that one would have to have access to knowledge that seems to be safely outside of what we can confidently say we have before one can make a proclamation of this sort.

Gisteron wrote: In order to have control, would we not need to have knowledge/understanding? Why is this a fallacious inference to make, that the extent to which we control our environment it is known to us, and by extension, the extent to which we can maximize control is as well the extent to which we can minimize the unknown?

Would one not have to know enough of the environment and the Force and the amount of human knowledge in order to make that comparison? How do you know how much there is to know? I'm not necessarily arguing the opposite here - though this is not to say that I couldn't - I'm just pointing out that one would have to have access to knowledge that seems to be safely outside of what we can confidently say we have before one can make a proclamation of this sort.

I'd argue that the amount of knowledge required to actually control our environment is simply unobtainable. Anything we believe we know can only approximate complete knowledge, which usually falls short so badly that what be believe is "control" is simply an educated guess with so many undefined variables that the outcome is haphazard to a high degree. If the outcome apparently seems to be what we expected, we feel encouraged that it was our controlling the situation that led to a certain outcome. Which of course in some cases it will - but mostly, our actions cause more reactions than meet the eye - and these reactions might get back at us in ways that we simply can't fathom. They may be so far removed from the original event that our "knowledge", again, fails to enable us to see the entirety of the system.

Within the elaborate, universal system of cause and effect in which we live, the only truly controllable situation would be an enclosed simulation / an altered environment - a sub-system that we have created ourselves in which our own rules are the only rules. In nature, this is not possible. We can build decent roads to minimise the risk while driving. We can build a house to minimise the risk of being exposed to the elements. But none of that is more than a crude attempt at control and may fail us at any time.

Being able to let go of trying to control what we can't control leads to peace of mind. At least it does for me - your mileage may vary.

Cyan Sarden wrote: I'd argue that the amount of knowledge required to actually control our environment is simply unobtainable.

Please, do.

Anything we believe we know can only approximate complete knowledge, ...

So can it approximate complete knowledge or is it but an infinitessimally small fraction of complete knowledge? Which is it?

... which usually falls short so badly that what be believe is "control" is simply an educated guess with so many undefined variables that the outcome is haphazard to a high degree.

Hardly. I don't understand why it has to be not just an all-or-nothing game, but a literally both-all-and-nothing. First we have almost no knowledge to speak of, then it is approximately complete, and now even that almost complete knowledge is somehow highly unreliable again. I don't think we would call it knowledge if we didn't have an extensive record of how useful it has been to us. We are talking about world wide communication devices essentially made out of rocks. Do we understand rocks perfectly? By some measures of perfection, yes, we do. Do we understand everything as well as we understand rocks? Far from it. They are guesses, but they are, as you put it, educated guesses, not wild ones. The variables are not undefined, but well known and deliberately left uncontrolled when we know that the material costs of keeping them under control does not outweigh the benefits it'd promise. I don't understand what you mean by "haphazard to a high degree", when our rock-machines are so powerful as to allow us to make predictions even about the most chaotic natural systems. We can debate whether it is all or nothing or something inbetween, but I don't understand when it is painted as if it were both, almost entirely beyond our grasp and almost entirely within it at the same time.

If the outcome apparently seems to be what we expected, we feel encouraged that it was our controlling the situation that led to a certain outcome.

Well, yes, if it works a billion times out of a billion attempts, and then another billion times out of another billion attempts with slight variations in the variables and outcomes matching the adjusted predictions, at some point one is bound to start growing confidence in the understanding. I don't know if there are philosophical traditions that find that unwarranted because warrant has to be ultimate to them, but then there is only so much time we have in life that we can reasonably reserve to worrying about things so thoroughly disconnected from it.

Which of course in some cases it will - but mostly, our actions cause more reactions than meet the eye - and these reactions might get back at us in ways that we simply can't fathom.

I don't understand what that means. Either we have knowledge of the system, which we demonstrate by successfully predicting its behaviour, or we fail to predict it, thus demonstrating that we do not have sufficient knowledge of it to not be failing like that. Again, it can't be both. You say it is fallacious to say that if we could control a system then it would be known to us, but what is knowledge if it doesn't manifest in power?

Within the elaborate, universal system of cause and effect in which we live, ...

Some people find that an intuitive way of describing event progressions. I don't. There is no definition of cause and effect that would allow us to separate coincidental event pairs from causally linked ones. For practical purposes, we do not live in any such universal system.

the only truly controllable situation would be an enclosed simulation / an altered environment - a sub-system that we have created ourselves in which our own rules are the only rules. In nature, this is not possible. We can build decent roads to minimise the risk while driving. We can build a house to minimise the risk of being exposed to the elements. But none of that is more than a crude attempt at control and may fail us at any time.

Not at any time. We can predict to within known and finite margins of error how well the crude attempt at control will serve us and for how long. Again you seem to be voicing this sensibility that control isn't "truly" control unless and until it is total in scope. Why? What I've been asking is why it is fallacious to think that control correlates negatively with un-knowledge. How else would we measure knowledge? The absoluteness of knowledge or of control or their respective lacking in limitlessness is entirely irrelevant to that question.

> Why is this a fallacious inference to make, that the extent to which we control our environment it is known to us, and by extension, the extent to which we can maximize control is as well the extent to which we can minimize the unknown?

You might have given the answer yourself:
>one would have to have access to knowledge that seems to be safely outside of what we can confidently say we have before one can make a proclamation of this sort.

Working Hypothesis:
the extent to which we can minimize the unknown IS NOT rhe extent to which we can maximize control

Approach: because it is not possible to minimize something that is not known.

Let's try and think this through using some math.

Let K be a set, or a world, that countains all the known knowledge. Let's say there is also a time t and a state K_t of what is known at time t. Let c(K) be a function that expresses that you have managed to control what is in this set and make good predictions of how K_t+1 will look like a future time t+1, because you know K_t and that K_t+1=c(k_t). Now let there be an Environment E of this K, which has a set of unknown elements U which is disjunct, not connected to the elements in K.
It is obvious that it is possible to maximize K by creating new elements of it, through using c(K). Yo might be able to find a lot of new elements that you can create. There might even be no limits. Or there may be limits. It all depends on K and c(K).
But how would it be possible to minimize the cardinality of the set U in the environment E, with the same delta of how the cardinality of the set K was maximized? K and U are disjunct. There is no connection, isn't it?

I tried to find one, but failed:
We assume there is possible control of the unknown, c2(U) which is somehow corelated with c(K), some kind of say c2(U)=m*c(K). An unknown control of the unknown through the control c of what is known and some other sort of mapping m.
How would we be able to tell how much of U would we be able to control with our combined function ?
Let's say we maximize m*c(K) and so will see c2(U) going up as well. But what can we say about what U might do?
We can not tell if it is going to minimize, because we do not know anything about this U and c2(U).

Or speaking about controllable error, how large would the error be of trying to control and know something of which nothing, neither magnitude, quantity nor quality, is known, and which can not be accessed, nor measured, nor be in any relation to anything known?

In a distributed system, there might be a model running quite well, with little error, accurate predictions, and maximized knowledge within its context. Somewhere 'next to it', there might things be happening, irrelevant to the model and its context, but nevertheless existing, that are there even if they are and will remain completely unknown to the model.

I recently drove in my car thinking about what you said about predictive models. I agreed with you. It is all about how accurate we can predict the future. I am driving, controlling, keeping distances to the left and the right, knowing when to turn right, I have an accurate model of driving. Am just about to take it for the world, my mind being proud about it's predictions and ability to control everything. Then I see a nun in another car driving towards me. And I realised: How could I have ever predicted that a nun would be passing by in a car? Even if I would have had all the knowledge about my predictive model?

It is not only that I would have had to process an awkward amount of complexity to predict this. It is also that if I assume that any model has a context or environment, there are always things completely unknown to the model. It can never be complete.

Ambert The Traveller wrote: > Why is this a fallacious inference to make, that the extent to which we control our environment it is known to us, and by extension, the extent to which we can maximize control is as well the extent to which we can minimize the unknown?

You might have given the answer yourself:
>one would have to have access to knowledge that seems to be safely outside of what we can confidently say we have before one can make a proclamation of this sort.

I don't understand how the latter passage is any kind of answer to the question from the former. Please, explain.

Let K be a set, or a world, that countains all the known knowledge. Let's say there is also a time t and a state K_t of what is known at time t. Let c(K) be a function that expresses that you have managed to control what is in this set and make good predictions of how K_t+1 will look like a future time t+1, because you know K_t and that K_t+1=c(k_t).

So here we have a problem. K_t is said to be a state. c operates at least on sets as implied by its introduction as c(K), and it returns TRUE or FALSE depending on whether I have yet managed to control what is "in" its argument, whether by "in" you mean as an element or as a subset. I don't understand how to interpret "K_t+1=c(k_t)" at all, though. What does that mean? Is a state also just a truth value?

Now let there be an Environment E of this K, which has a set of unknown elements U which is disjunct, not connected to the elements in K.

What does any of this mean? What is an "Environment" and what does it mean for it to "have" the set U? By "disjunct" I would have assumed you meant disjoint with K, since K is the set of known things and U is literally the set of things that are not in K (assuming that is what you meant by unknown elements rather than that we do not know what is or isn't an element of U). But then you elaborate and say that U is "not connected to the elements in K" which also makes no sense at all. Do you mean it doesn't overlap with K? I don't know what it means for a set to be "connected" or not to the elements of another. I'll assume you mean disjoint, but please, try and be more precise with your wording when constructing formal mathematical arguments.

It is obvious that it is possible to maximize K by creating new elements of it, through using c(K). Yo [sic] might be able to find a lot of new elements that you can create. There might even be no limits. Or there may be limits. It all depends on K and c(K).

K is a set, not a value. I wasn't going for mathematical pedantry in my responses earlier, but I do have to now since that is how we are framing it now. You do go on to clarify that you mean maximize the cardinality of K, so I shan't dwell on this point. Anyway, if it is possible to maximize that, then there must be an actual limit to how big K can get, even if that bound is some kind of infinity. If it is conceivable that there be no limit at all, then it is not obvious at all that it can be maximized. c(K) at any rate is either TRUE or FALSE by the only definition you have proposed for it. Maybe that is what all the elements of K are, though from what I know of "worlds" in the possible worlds metaphysical sense is that they are sets of propositions, not sets of truth values, so I don't understand how you can generate an element of K through c(K).

But how would it be possible to minimize the cardinality of the set U in the environment E, with the same delta of how the cardinality of the set K was maximized? K and U are disjunct. There is no connection, isn't it?

Not the way you have defined them so far, no. But I'm not sure that the definitions as you have proposed them reflect what we mean when we speak of the known and the unknown. Surely, when something is not known, it is not just something other than known, it is specifically something that is not known. So yes, the set K of known things and the set U of unknown things are disjoint but they are also complementary within the set L of the things there are to know. For x to be in U is equivalent to it not being in K and vice versa. Thus, as we increase the "size" of one (I assume the subset relation as the order used to compare sets), we necessarily decrease the "size" of the other. When something becomes known, it doesn't just poof into K out of nowhere, it specifically ceases to be unknown, moves out of U and into K.

I tried to find one, but failed:
We assume there is possible control of the unknown, c2(U) which is somehow corelated with c(K), some kind of say c2(U)=m*c(K). An unknown control of the unknown through the control c of what is known and some other sort of mapping m.

I would caution against making that assumption. Recall that the proposition you are trying to test/prove is that there is a distinction between the set of things that can be controlled and the set of things that are known. To assume that having control of the known grants control of the unknown is tantamount to assuming the conclusion you are trying to reach in the first place.

Or speaking about controllable error, how large would the error be of trying to control and know something of which nothing, neither magnitude, quantity nor quality, is known, and which can not be accessed, nor measured, nor be in any relation to anything known?

In a distributed system, there might be a model running quite well, with little error, accurate predictions, and maximized knowledge within its context. Somewhere 'next to it', there might things be happening, irrelevant to the model and its context, but nevertheless existing, that are there even if they are and will remain completely unknown to the model.

I recently drove in my car thinking about what you said about predictive models. I agreed with you. It is all about how accurate we can predict the future. I am driving, controlling, keeping distances to the left and the right, knowing when to turn right, I have an accurate model of driving. Am just about to take it for the world, my mind being proud about it's predictions and ability to control everything. Then I see a nun in another car driving towards me. And I realised: How could I have ever predicted that a nun would be passing by in a car? Even if I would have had all the knowledge about my predictive model?

It is not only that I would have had to process an awkward amount of complexity to predict this. It is also that if I assume that any model has a context or environment, there are always things completely unknown to the model. It can never be complete.

Well, I think it is somewhat debatable whether or not it will never be complete, but yes, in principle I agree. You know enough about your car to control it, but you don't know enough about traffic to be in control of all of that as well. We can manipulate things only as well as we understand them. And to say we understand them makes any sense only if at least in principle we could manipulate them. What is outside of our understanding is outside of our control for that reason, and where we err the least is with things we know the most about.

Cyan Sarden wrote: Our apparent need for control is the result of an incomplete / undeveloped mind. One that is driven by instinct rather than rational thought.

The obsession to control arises from fear of the unknown. We fallaciously believe that there is no unknown as long as we seemingly control our environment.

The fact is: once we've conquered our fear of the unknown (and in our lives, close to everything is unknown - what we believe to know is only a infinitesimally tiny amount of our actual environment and our place in the Force), the need for control automatically disappears.

The sooner we realize fearlessness and stop wasting our resources on attempting to control what is inherently chaotic and uncontrollable, the sooner we become peaceful, free from fear and happy. We can then use our resources to benefit others.

@ Cyan
Is cultivation or preparation based from fear or planning or from experience ? Both in the physical and spiritual sense? Is all control just a waist? Just wondering your side is all Cyan. Smiley face

ghost of the mist wrote: Control is something we as humans completely need. Or is it?

What do you mean by control? Do you mean predictability, being able to foretell what will come, and direct circumstances? What about people who are utterly depressed because they have everything, and crave spontaneity? It seems as humans we have at least as much of a need for unpredictability as the other way around.

I myself think that it is the great downfall of man. It is our need for control that keeps us at war. It is why countries are so often times at odds with one another. I wish to see the Jedi community's opinion upon this matter.

It seems to me that our need for control is also what secures peace. And progress. The need to control our health spawns medical progress. Our need to control world affairs and the power balance is also what spawns diplomacy and international organizations.

What is the alternative you offer for control? Do you suggest we should simply not care, and let the world be? How would this be different from neglect?

Gisteron wrote:

Ambert The Traveller wrote:

Gisteron wrote: Why is this a fallacious inference to make, that the extent to which we control our environment it is known to us, and by extension, the extent to which we can maximize control is as well the extent to which we can minimize the unknown?

You might have given the answer yourself:
>one would have to have access to knowledge that seems to be safely outside of what we can confidently say we have before one can make a proclamation of this sort.

I don't understand how the latter passage is any kind of answer to the question from the former. Please, explain.

You were referring to the part of knowledge that is unknown (since we don't have it yet), and I interpreted 'to be safely outside of what we can confidently say we have' as referring to the part safely outside of what we can access. Not sure if you meant this, too, or if I just heard it that way. But Let's say we can't access this knowledge, and it is unknown, how is it possible that it can be minimized? After all, we have no idea of it's extent, it could even be unlimited.

I don't understand how to interpret "K_t+1=c(k_t)" at all, though. What does that mean? Is a state also just a truth value?

Yes, disjoint, not disjunct, that got lost in translation. And k_t was supposed to be in uppercase. My apologies. I imagine the K to be a set of states of 'knowledge elements'. They do not have to be boolean. Could be numbers, strings, objects,... of any class inventable. Let K_t+1 then be the set of knowledge elements resulting from controling the initial set of knowledge elements over time (through being able to measure, deduct, etc.). Such that with good knowledge and a good control, a good predictive model K_t+x would result.

What is an "Environment" and what does it mean for it to "have" the set U?

Let K be the set of things known to a controlling observer; and U the set of things not known to this observer. Now say there is an E, the 'environment', which represents the world, the surroundings, or context which the observer is going to learn and control about. The bounds of E are unknown. At the beginning, E is full of elements in U, yet unknown to the observer. Let the observer now strive to use his knowledge in order to learn about these elements, thus moving elements formerly unknown from U to the set of things K known to him. So, yes, U contains things that are not in K, and U and K are disjoint sets.
Your hypothesis was, as I understood it, that by moving these elements from U to K, the set U would be minimized. And you are right that this holds true, if U and K are complimentary in a set of the things L there are to know, as you suggested.

Nevertheless, in an environment E as defined above, surrounding the controlling observer with unknown bounds, there are elements of U that are not to know, and can not be transformed to K. For whatever reason. Maybe because the observer does not have the perception or tools for it. Or they are to far away. Whatever. Let's call these elements U_. E would contain your L=K union U, but it would also contain U_. You could minimize |U| by maximizing |K|, but never |U_|.

You do go on to clarify that you mean maximize the cardinality of K, so I shan't dwell on this point. Anyway, if it is possible to maximize that, then there must be an actual limit to how big K can get, even if that bound is some kind of infinity. If it is conceivable that there be no limit at all, then it is not obvious at all that it can be maximized.

Exactly. And the same holds for U_. U and U_ can not be minimized, as long as there is the slightest chance their cardinality is unlimited. Then there is no way how we could limit what is unknown by maximizing what is known, even if it was possible we could maximize what is known.

Recall that the proposition you are trying to test/prove is that there is a distinction between the set of things that can be controlled and the set of things that are known. To assume that having control of the known grants control of the unknown is tantamount to assuming the conclusion you are trying to reach in the first place.

Not really so. The proposition I was trying to test was if it is possible to minimize the unknown through maximizing control of what is known.

And I believe the results of our tests is that this might only be possible in a limited amount of scenarios?

It is also that if I assume that any model has a context or environment, there are always things completely unknown to the model. It can never be complete.

Well, I think it is somewhat debatable whether or not it will never be complete, but yes, in principle I agree. You know enough about your car to control it, but you don't know enough about traffic to be in control of all of that as well. We can manipulate things only as well as we understand them. And to say we understand them makes any sense only if at least in principle we could manipulate them. [/quote]
I hope there might still be things we are able to understand, but we wouldn't be able to manipulate them. Let's say, a vulcano? A supernova? A black hole? Unfortunately mankind seems to learn but trying to control (and blow up?) every new thing it finds, before it can finally say: We understand now that we should not have done this...

Ambert The Traveller wrote:

Gisteron wrote: Recall that the proposition you are trying to test/prove is that there is a distinction between the set of things that can be controlled and the set of things that are known.

Not really so. The proposition I was trying to test was if it is possible to minimize the unknown through maximizing control of what is known.

Interesting. I was under the impression that you were trying to show that

the extent to which we can minimize the unknown IS NOT rhe [sic] extent to which we can maximize control

which is equivalent to the proposition that there is a distinction between the set of things that can be controlled and the set of things that are known.

I'm still waiting to hear a definition of knowledge for the context at hand that would warrant any such distinction or any case as to why it is reasonable or productive to employ it. I have nothing to add to my case that

Gisteron wrote: ... the extent to which we control our environment it is known to us, and by extension, the extent to which we can maximize control is as well the extent to which we can minimize the unknown

Weak though my case has been in the first place, I'm still waiting on any substantive objection to any part of it.

Oh this philosphical beauty of math ...

I would not say it is equivalent. Because this is not necessarily boolean. The set_of_unknown_things is something different than just NOT(the_set_of_known_things). It is the set of things that are NOT(the_set_of_known_things) plus the set_of_all_other_unknown_things_that_can_not_be_known. We need to take into account that such a set may indeed exist. And if it exists, we it's cardinality may be unknown and might even be infinite. Without bounds, then, we can neither minimize this set_of_all_other_unknown_things, nor is it the extent to which we can maximize control.

The other assertion, that there is no distinction between the set_of_things_that_can_be_controlled and the set_of_things_that_are_known, is a different case. I understand that you are saying hypothesis is, that everything that is known can be controlled, and everything that can be controlled, can be known. I agree that this comes down to how one defines kowledge. Only one example of knowledge which is not the same as control will be enough to show that it indeed is not so. Let's say someone knows he is sick and will die. Everything was tried already and there is no control left, nothing he can do. Or someone is drunk and vomitting. And the person knows it is happening. But there is nothing that can be done about it. No control there, despite a gain in knowledge that it is happening.

Nevertheless, I believe I am getting your point. What we can control, we can measure, what we can measure we can know about, what we know about we can control. But I do not think this is the full picture. It only works within the limitations of a particular setting and model. Beyond this, there are things we can not control, we can not measure, we can not know about. If we would ignore this, we would be taking the model for the world, the map for the road.

Ambert The Traveller wrote: Oh this philosphical beauty of math ...

I would not say it is equivalent. Because this is not necessarily boolean. The set_of_unknown_things is something different than just NOT(the_set_of_known_things). It is the set of things that are NOT(the_set_of_known_things) plus the set_of_all_other_unknown_things_that_can_not_be_known. We need to take into account that such a set may indeed exist. And if it exists, we it's cardinality may be unknown and might even be infinite. Without bounds, then, we can neither minimize this set_of_all_other_unknown_things, nor is it the extent to which we can maximize control.

Oh, so you were working with a different definition of unknown then without disclosing it. See, I was operating under the assumption that "x is unknown" is equivalent to "it is not the case that 'x is known'". Whether or not it is possible to know x is entirely irrelevant for that definition. The set of unknown things is - in my usage of the term - just the set of things for which it is not the case that they are known. As such, the unknowable would be a subset of the things that are not known.
However, I don't find that this has anything to do with the claim. I had asserted that the extent to which we know our environment is the extent to which we can (by some agreeable definition of control) control it, at least in principle. The extension does not assert that there is a maximal magnitude of control (and hence knowledge) that it be possible to reach. Rather, I'm saying that insofar as we can increase (or indeed maximize) control, it is equivalent to decreasing (or minimizing, as the case may be) the amount of things unknown to us. If we cannot maximize/minimize those respective things at all, then that's fine, too; all I'm saying is that it cannot be that we can optimize one without optimizing the other because there is a monotony between the cardinality of the set of things known to us and the cardinality of the set of things controllable (by that agreeable definition) by us.

The other assertion, that there is no distinction between the set_of_things_that_can_be_controlled and the set_of_things_that_are_known, is a different case. I understand that you are saying hypothesis is, that everything that is known can be controlled, and everything that can be controlled, can be known. I agree that this comes down to how one defines kowledge. Only one example of knowledge which is not the same as control will be enough to show that it indeed is not so. Let's say someone knows he is sick and will die. Everything was tried already and there is no control left, nothing he can do. Or someone is drunk and vomitting. And the person knows it is happening. But there is nothing that can be done about it. No control there, despite a gain in knowledge that it is happening.

I don't understand why we need to assume that knowing death is coming or knowing of a happenstance automatically is to warrant the knower control over literally everything going on. Nothing about "I know I'm going to die" sounds at all like "I know how to cheat death" to me. Nothing about "I am aware of my inebriation and my body's current reaction to it" sounds at all like "I know how to magic myself out of drunkenness right now" to me. Now, of course that is not what you were saying, and it is perhaps a natural and worthwhile question to ask, just what control the knowledge of impending death might grant. Well, perhaps someone who gets to know of the tragedy ahead might in virtue of that knowledge obtain the opportunity to contact their friends and relatives, arrange a last meeting, tell them they love them one last time while there still is any, or speak their wishes of the future after their passing. Would the sick one not know of their soon demise, they would not have any influence over the pain their death may produce in others. That is, granted not a lot of control, just like the message of death incoming is not a lot of knowledge. If one could not find any examples of control to correspond to awareness of some bit of information, then I would question whether that awareness really constitutes "knowledge" in any meaningful sense. After all, knowledge is demonstrable, it is evident. If someone has nothing to show for "it", I find, then knowledge "it" can hardly be.

And I don't think that this is at all mitigated or challenged by the supposition of the unknowable. If we are unable to come to know a thing, we are unable to come to control it also by the very same pragmatic notion of knowledge. The only substantive challenge I see is whether or not there is a case to be made that we might do well employing such a definition. Cyan had said that it is fallacious to believe that as long as we can control our environment there is no unknown to speak of. I agree insofar as that our environment may well be a different scope from case to case, and that if it is chosen narrow enough, there may well be things outside of it that are not known despite the things inside being under control. The point I'm making is that this may not work in extension. If I mean by knowledge a capacity for control, however, then when we say we control our environment to one extent or another, we would mean that we have knowledge of the environment to that very same extent, i.e. the unknown (knowable or unknowable) remaining in it is confined to the uncontrollable, pretty much by definition.

It's all inference at the end of the day I suppose, with 'truth' being somethings appearance as a balance of likely correlation or likely causation... a process of deduction or maybe its all just abduction.

What has 'truth' to do with anything here? We can build any number of valid or 'true' inferences, but yes, at the end of the day precious little has it to do with knowledge or control in the senses mostly hitherto discussed.

Gisteron wrote: What has 'truth' to do with anything here? We can build any number of valid or 'true' inferences, but yes, at the end of the day precious little has it to do with knowledge or control in the senses mostly hitherto discussed.

An appearance of truth tends to suspend ones disbelief and subdue criticality, and subsequent analysis... which can enable control more easily.