Occasioned by recent events, there are some quite strong emotions being expressed with regard to the ideological clash that underpins them. We tend to fall into the Manichean ditch then, judging some as good, others as evil ; one is then disposed to entertaining and harbouring ideas as to what the “evil-doers” deserve.
In a number of the general discussions going on (the « war vs. crime », the one about the attack in Nice, the one about Turkey and so forth), there has been pretty clear evidence that everyone is exploring their notions about how to do Justice. Somewhat understandably, our ideas of Justice are coming off on the punitive angle. What remains a little vague is how much genuinely felt Compassion is being displayed – not only for the victims of violence and the suffering of the most unfortunate affected by what has been emerging on our socio-politico-economic landscape – but for everyone, “evil-doers” included. Can it be that anyone does not deserve compassion ?
In correspondence to the three tenets of focus, knowledge and wisdom, let’s meander around the notion of compassion in hopes of gaining some further understanding of what the compassionate person feels, for whom and possibly some of the thinking (some of which cannot be formulated with any verbal analytical or textual precision) when compassion is felt.
What do we mean when we say that we are feeling “compassion” ? For as pretty as it may sound, Compassion is not a positive emotion. It is a painful feeling brought on by the pain of another creature, human or otherwise. There are three essential thoughts (albeit, I’m using the term ‘thought’ here rather expansively – it may not be a cognitive ‘thought’) that give rise to the feeling of Compassion :
First, we find that to feel compassion for someone, we must consider their suffering to be over a serious, non-trivial matter. We do not feel compassion for someone who is complaining over something that we feel to be just, as when a rich person is required to pay a fair amount of taxes. For genuine compassion to be aroused, we must understand the problem faced by the suffering person is indeed causing them a grave dilemma, not a merely unpleasant circumstance of life.
Secondly, compassion requires us to see the suffering of the one for whom it is felt to not have been caused by him/herself. There must be the judgement of non-fault on the suffering person. As such, we would not feel compassion for someone complaining of a lack of trust that others would place in them were we to know that this person rarely tells the truth/honours commitments. The suffering may be circumstantial, but not directly caused by the person to whom it comes. This is related to the compassion that one can have for the heroes in Greek tragedy, who falls into the state of anaitios – not responsible for her/his own downfall.
Lastly, there must be a recognition that our possibilities in Life are similar : we have similar vulnerabilities. It is sign of recognition of our shared humanity – even our shared “animality” – of being incarnated living beings experiencing joys and pains in Life. We are all subject to the pain of unmet needs, unfulfilled desires, and existential angst. We are all prone to bodily and emotional pain – as are other non-human animals. There is a very urgent potential for danger when we deny our own animal nature : objectification of other human beings and animals as resources for our exploitation : means for satisfying ends.
Another support for, though not a foundational element of, compassion is eudaimonistic thinking. This is where the thoughts – of feelings (whether those feelings are textually formulated or not) – about the suffering person are amplified by the thought that the person(s) affected are important to one’s own sense of well-being. This is most clearly evident when the person suffering is very close, but can also be aroused when it involves persons in a distant land – victims of natural catastrophe or warfare, perhaps – or the members of other animal species ; the thought is that the others’ welfare is important to one’s own. This is not egotism in its proper sense, but the outgrowth of our natural inclination to empathy.
Empathy, this is not an essential element of compassion either, although compassion can or does indeed grow out of it. Empathy, in itself is not sufficient to produce compassion. It is the development of the ability to imagine the suffering of another/others from that point of view – not one’s own (empathy is not “imagining what this would be like if it were me” – that would still be one’s own perspective). The imaginative leap is thus perspectival : we maintain the “self/other” distinction in order to confront the situation from the others’ unique point-of-view.
Thus, as it were, with the conjunction of these fundamentals, we cultivate the ability to see others, be they intimate or unknown to us, as distinct and inimitable centres of experience. It is this recognition, this expansive understanding (though without “having understood”) which fosters the feeling of our shared humanity (even with non-human beings) and grounds us in the unitive, though inexpressible, continuum of existence reassured though genuine compassion.
May the Force be with you all …
(Acknowledgements to Dr Martha Nussbaum)
